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The method of increasing the productive capacity of the factory
is always an important problem and is oftentimes one very difficult
of satisfactory solution. In this paper, the author presents the several
methods of securing increased capacity, considers briefly their respective
points of merit and demerit, and then passes on to a detailed examination
of the relation of the various systems of wage payment to the problem
of securing an increased factory output by this means.
The author, R. R. Thompson, is professor of accounting at McGill
Univesity, Montreal. He was educated at Wallasey Grammar School,
served articles (5 yrs.) of apprenticeship to W. Griswood & Son,
Chartered Accountants, Liverpool, England, 1905-1909 inclusive. He was
admitted as an Associate Member of the Institute of Chartered Ac
countants of England and Wales, August, 1910, and continued in general
practice with W. Griswood & Son until October, 1912. During this
period he was lecturer in Accountancy for evening classes held under
auspices of Liverpool & Widnes Municipalities, England. He became
Treasury Auditor in British Civil Service under the National Insurance
Scheme, November, 1912. Upon the outbreak of the war, August 4,
1914 he was mobilized as Second Lieutenant with the Fifth Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders serving in Gallipoli, Sinai Desert, and Palestine.
He took up his duties at McGill University August, 1921; was admitted
a member of the Association of the Accountants in Montreal (Chartered
Accountants) 1925.
He is a member of the Canadian Society of Cost Accountants and
of the American Association of University Instructors in Accounting.
This paper was delivered before the Montreal Chapter of the Canadian
Society of Cost Accountants.

VARIOUS WAGE-SYSTEMS IN RELATION TO FACTORY
INDIRECT CHARGES

If a manufacturing concern is faced with the problem of an
extraordinary demand for its products beyond what its present
equipment and methods are capable of supplying, it has four
courses open. It may:
1. Buy elsewhere and re-sell
2. Enlarge its factory and increase its productive capacity
3. Work longer hours, that is, overtime, or possibly have two
or three shifts of men
4. Produce more in the time already worked by giving its
workmen an inducement, by means of a bonus or
premium on their wages, to speed up production.
In deciding upon which course to pursue, the following con
siderations should first be taken into account:
1. If the first course is adopted, the concern loses all the profit
that it could make by manufacturing more cheaply than
it can buy.
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2. The second course entails an outlay of capital in assets
which will bring their own overhead charges. After
the extraordinary demand has ceased these assets may
be lying idle, earning nothing, and the standing over
head charges, such as obsolescence, decrepitude, insur
ance, care-taking, etc., are still running on. The capital
invested is locked up and not available for other uses,
and would, if raised on loan, be giving rise to an interest
charge.
3. The third course entails no outlay of capital in fixed assets,
and little or no increase in the standing indirect charges,
such as obsolescence and decrepitude of buildings and
machinery, insurance of these assets, etc. It will entail,
however, an increase, proportional to the extra time
worked, in those indirect charges which vary with the
volume of production and constitute the fluctuating in
direct charges, such as indirect labor, power, wear and
tear of machinery, consumption of tools, spoiled work,
and so on. This course may also entail a heavy increase
in direct wages, because of overtime rates, unless extra
men are taken on and unless different parties of them
are worked in a series of shifts. If extra men are taken
on, then, when slack times come, they will have to be
discharged, and possibly there will be the extra expense
of sending them to their homes.
4. If the fourth course is adopted this, too, results in no outlay
of fixed capital and no increase in standing indirect
charges. The fluctuating indirect charges will increase,
but as a rule should not do so in anything like the same
proportion as the production. The object of giving the
bonus is to get the men to waste no time, to increase
their skill and speed, and so to produce for the manu
facturer more goods in proportion to the indirect factory
charges than they have done hitherto.
Since the main thesis of my paper is the relation of various
wage systems to this problem of production, we must now consider
the principal varieties of wage-systems under which bonuses are
paid for increased production, from two points of view, the work
man’s and the manufacturer’s.
Viewing the matter from what is largely the workman’s stand
point, we will see how his hourly remuneration rises in comparison
with his increase in speed of production. By “hourly remunera
tion” I mean the total sum paid to the man per hour, including
both regular wages and bonus. The manufacturer, also, must con
sider the matter from the workman’s standpoint, because the latter
will speed up in proportion, roughly, to the rate by which his
hourly remuneration increases. As the workman speeds up, and
saves time, which is used for further production, so does the manu
facturer get more production for his indirect factory charges. To
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repeat, a quantity of the indirect charges, hitherto used up entirely
for a certain quantity of production, is saved and is used for further
production. But all depends on the rate up to which the men
will speed, and that depends, in the end, mainly on the hourly
remuneration.
Viewing the matter from what I will call the manufacturer’s
standpoint, we will consider the limit, up to which it will pay the
manufacturer to give an extra bonus in order to save factory
overhead or indirect charges, as they are variously called. Unless
there are special circumstances, such as might exist in the case
of a “rush” job, it will manifestly be worse than useless for a
manufacturer to pay, for example, an extra 30 cents in hourly
remuneration in order to save 25 cents an hour in factory overhead
or indirect charges.
It is assumed, of course, that for the purposes of these com
parisons all work turned out is of an equal standard. Obviously,
a producer of spoiled goods can never be a cheap producer, however
fast he may be. We must not confuse the issues.
We can divide all of these wage-systems into three main
groups:
1. Those in which the employer shares in the working time
or wages saved by the direct worker’s increased speed, principally
because the increased speed in production usually results in in
creased factory overhead, more power, etc., being consumed. If
factory overhead remains at its ordinary rate the employer saves
not only wages but factory overhead as well; and even if the
factory overhead charges are running at a slightly greater rate,
because of increased pressure, they are running for a less time
and a saving in expense will be made. Of these, the principal
systems to be considered are the Halsey, Rowan, and Barth.
2. Those in which the employer saves nothing in wages, paying
to the direct workmen and their helpers the full rate for the work
done, whether it is done at normal rates of speed or more rapidly.
These comprise the Ordinary Piece Rate System, and the Bedeaux
Point System. Under the Ordinary Piece Rate, if the direct work
man is below normal he is paid only for the work actually com
pleted, while under the Bedeaux Point System he is paid the
normal time rate.
3. Those in which the employer pays the direct worker the
full rate for the work done, together with a bonus which, as the
worker’s speed increases, results in an increase in the hourly re
muneration paid. This is done where the factory indirect charges
are so heavy that it pays the employer to give the workman an
extra bonus in order to save time. These systems are the Taylor
Differential Piece-Rate, the Gantt, and the Emerson.
In all of the systems in these three groups, except the Ordinary
Piece-Rate System, the employer must be able to estimate before
hand the time which an average man working at normal rate will
take for a job. That time is the standard time and gives the
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Standard speed. Sometimes, it is called the previous average time,
but by whatever name its use is the same. For a certain job a
definite period of time is allotted. As the direct workman improves
on this time, so does he get a bonus.
Under piece-rate systems, if the worker is below standard, his
remuneration falls accordingly. Under the others, if he cannot
reach a certain rate of production, he is usually changed to other
work. After inspection of the graph you will note how expensive
it is to employ workmen whose production is less than normal.
Now, the relative values of these various systems as incentives
to increase production can be measured best by looking at them
from the workman’s standpoint. What will he be paid per hour
for his work under the different systems? Quite apart from the
nominal rate of pay, what will be his remuneration per hour?
What will he get in dollars and cents?
In order to compare the different schemes, I have taken a job
consisting of 120 pieces, which a first-class man working normally
would complete in 120 hours. The hourly rate of pay, for the
sake of simplicity, was taken at $1 per hour. The ordinary piecerate would be $1 per piece. I will now direct your attention to the
following statement which shows the hourly remuneration, under
these various wage-systems, of direct workmen of various speed
efficiencies. A man’s speed efficiency is reckoned as follows:
Standard Time
--------------------- X 100.
Time Used
Thus, a man who completes 120 pieces in 120 hours is 100%
efficient in speed.
If a man completes 120 pieces in 150 hours his percentage of
120
speed-efficiency is------ X 100 or 80.
150
If a man completes 120 pieces in 100 hours his percentage of
120
speed-efficiency is------ X 100 or 120.
100
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Statement to Show Total and Hourly Remunerations for a
Job Received Under Various Wage-Systems by Workmen
of Various Speed-Efficiencies.
Time Taken in Hours..
Percentage of Efficiency
Halsey:
Total Remuneration ...
Hourly Remuneration..
Rowan:
Total Remuneration ...
Hourly Remuneration..
Barth:
Total Remuneration ...
Hourly Remuneration..
Bedeaux:
Total Remuneration ...
Hourly Remuneration..
Taylor (25% Bonus
at 110% Efficiency):
Total Remuneration ...
Hourly Remuneration..
Gantt (Bonus of
20% commencing
at 120% Efficiency):
Total Remuneration ...
Hourly Remuneration..
Emerson*:
Total Remuneration ...
Hourly Remuneration..

181.82
66

171.42
70

150
80

133.3
90

120
100

109.09
110

100
120

92.3
130

85.7
140

80.
150

181.82
1.00

171.42
1.00

150
1.00

133.30
1.00

120
1.00

114.54
1.05

110
1.10

106.15
1.15

102.85
1.20

100
1.25

181.82
1.00

171.42
1.00

150
1.00

133.30
1.00

120
1.00

119
1.09

116.66
1.16

113.60
1.23

110.20
1.28

106.66
1.33

147.71
.81

143.42
.83

134.20
.89

126.47
.95

120
1.00

114.41
1.05

109.54
1.09

105.24
1.14

101.41
1.18

97.98
1.22

181.82
1.00

171.42
1.00

150
1.00

133.30
1.00

120
1.00

117.28
1.07

115
1.15

113.08
1.22

111.42
1.30

110.
1.37

120
0.66

120
0.70

120
0.80

120
0.90

120
1.00

150
1.37

150
1.50

150
1.62

150
1.75

150
1.87

181.82
1.00

171.42
1.00

150
1.00

133.30
1.00

120
1.00

109.09 126
1.00
1.26

126
1.36

126
1.47

126
1.57

181.82 171.42 154.80 14651 144
141.81 140
138.46 137.14 136
1.00
1.00
1.03
1.09
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.60
1.70
* If the rate of pay used under the Emerson System be 83⅓% of the rate used for all of the others,
the hourly remuneration for the first-class man working at normal speed, that is, at 100% speed-efficiency,
will be the same as under the other systems. If this had been done in the above statement the resultant
figures would have been as follows:
Total Remuneration... †151.52 143.16 129.00 122.08 120.00 118.18 116.66 115.38 114.28 113.33
Hourly Remuneration..
0.83⅓ 0.83⅟2 0.86
0.91
1.00
1.08⅓ 1.16
1.25
1.33 1.41⅔
It will be noted that after 100% speed-efficiency has been reached, where $1.00 per hour is used, the
increase in hourly remuneration per 10% of speed-efficiency is $0,100; whilst, where $0.83⅓ per hour is
used the increase is $0.083.
Total remuneration for the job, and hourly remuneration are shown in dollars. Calculations are
approximate.

Next, I will direct your attention to the graph, page 288,
which shows the relative increases in hourly remuneration of men
working at different speeds under the different wage-systems.
Please note especially the diagonal line which marks the increase
in speed-efficiency. All of the other lines must be considered in
relation to this line.
We will now consider the main features of the various systems
with the statement and the graph before us.
Halsey:

The workman is paid the ordinary hourly rate for the time
worked, until he takes less than standard time. He is then paid
the ordinary rate for the time worked, and gets as a bonus the
ordinary rate for half of the time saved. You will note that, after
100% speed-efficiency has been passed, the hourly remuneration
rises steadily and indefinitely—its line is quite straight—but that
it is nothing like in proportion to the increase in effort by the work
man. For this reason, men will speed up to a point that does not
cause them serious discomfort, but no further, as it is not worth
while to them. Up to 200% speed-efficiency, that is to say for all
practical purposes, it is the cheapest scheme to the employer, with
the exception of the Barth. It is easy to introduce.
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Graph to Show Relative Increases in Hourly Remuneration
Under Various Wage-Systems by Workmen of Various
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Rowan :

In this, also, the workman is paid the ordinary hourly rate for
the time worked until he exceeds 100% speed-efficiency.
His remuneration then is:

As the time saved increases and with it the percentage that fixes
the rate of bonus, so does the base, to which this percentage is
applied, decrease. The result in the graph is a parabolic curve
which becomes merged into and coincident with the $2.00 line at
infinity. Thus, a man can never get twice the hourly rate. This
system is very generous up to 150% speed efficiency, but after that
rises more and more slowly. Again, the reward for an exceptional
performance is so reduced that the workman will not speed up past
a certain point. It is easy to obtain a substantial increase by only
moderate exertions, whilst further exertions give the workman only
a relatively much smaller increase. On the other hand, in a factory
where experience does not help a great deal, it is difficult to estimate
the proper Standard Time for jobs, and big mistakes may be made
—usually in over-estimation. This system acts automatically. If
a standard is fair it will be unusual for a man to do a job in less
than 2/3 of Standard Time, that is with a speed-efficiency of 150%.
If he does it in
or 1/3 of Standard Time, giving him 200% or
300% speed-efficiency, it will usually mean that a serious mistake
has been made in over-estimating the Standard Time. This system
saves the employer from serious loss in the event of an over
estimate of Standard Time. Some say that, if the employer’s
time estimates are very wide of the mark, he deserves to lose, and
they condemn this system because they say that it is unfair to the
extremely fast workman. Let them say that to the employer who
wishes to speed-up production, and yet who has many practical dif
ficulties to contend with, which will prevent him from correctly
estimating the Standard Times during one or perhaps several ac
counting periods. If the Standard Time has been estimated with
reasonable accuracy the workman will get a much more generous
bonus under this scheme, than under the others in this group, unless
he is a worker of most wonderful speed.
Barth:

Mr. Barth conceived his system from the Halsey. The re
muneration in the Halsey System consists of the ordinary hourly
rate for the arithmetical mean between the Time Worked and the
Standard Time. Mr. Barth thought of these as two straight lines,
but, instead of laying them side by side, he laid them at right
angles, thought of the rectangle indicated, of a square equal in
area, and then of the side of that square. He took the geometrical
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instead of the arithmetical mean. The result was the following
formula for finding a man’s total remuneration for a job:

The Hourly Remuneration under this scheme =

It will be noted that the Standard Time figure remains con
stant, while the Time Used figure decreases and occurs in both
numerator and denominator. The result in the graph is a very
flat parabolic curve—so flat as almost to be mistaken for a straight
line after 180% speed-efficiency has been passed.
Its hourly remuneration line in the graph will not cross the
Rowan line until after 255% speed-efficiency has been passed. It
is therefore the most economical from the employer’s standpoint.
In order to put it into effect the workmen have to be supplied with
slide-rules or computing diagrams.
All of the above systems save wages as well as indirect charges.
We will now consider the second group of systems.
Ordinary Piece Rate :

Men are paid according to production, whether great or small,
although in some trades a minimum wage is guaranteed. The
workman’s hourly remuneration increases exactly in proportion to
his speed-efficiency, and the two lines run coincidently in the graph.
Bedeaux Point System :

This saves no wages, as the employer pays away the whole of
the standard wages for a job. If time is saved, he gives 3/4 of the
pay for it to the direct workmen; and ⅟4is pooled for a bonus for
the indirect workmen. This is done to insure co-operation between
the two kinds of workmen. This system expresses all relationships
in “points.” A point represents the normal amount of work due
for a minute. Normal production equals 60 points per hour. Up
to this speed workmen are paid the normal rate per hour. Above
it the bonus commences. If a workman produces 68 points in an
hour, he receives credit for 60 + 6 points. Two points go into the
pool for indirect labor. If pay is at the rate of $1 per hour, the
rate per point is 12/3 cents. In this case, after 100% speed-effi
ciency, the Hourly Remuneration line of the direct worker is
straight, and, although it is much more generous than the Halsey,
still it does not rise in proportion to the man’s effort. The employer
does not save, and, accordingly, the line for the direct-workers’
Hourly Remuneration plus the bonus to the indirect workers runs
coincidently with that for speed-efficiency.
Other Systems:

There is another system, which I will simply note here. Under
it the direct workmen receive the ordinary hourly rate for 3/4 of
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the time saved. The pay for the remaining quarter is pooled, and
used to meet indirect charges, which are in excess of budget esti
mates. The amount not used in this manner is distributed among
the direct workmen.
We will now consider the third group, that is, those systems
under which an extra payment, over and above the ordinary hourly
or piece rate, is made for the purpose of saving factory overhead.
Taylor Differential Piece-Rate:

Under this a minimum daily-wage is not assured. Two piece
rates are used. One, the ordinary rate, is used for performances
below the standard set. Another, 25% or 50% in excess of the
ordinary, is used for men who attain a high standard of speed and
better. In this case the standard has been taken at 110% of
normal speed-efficiency. The bonus increase is taken at 25%. It
will be noted that its hourly remuneration line runs coincidently
with the Speed-Efficiency line, then takes a jump, and rises more
rapidly than the speed-efficiency. In other words, as the work
man’s speed increases, the employer gradually pays more and more
for the saving in factory indirect charges. The hourly remunera
125
tion increases at the rate of--------------- of the ordinary hourly
10 x 100
rate per 10% of Speed-Efficiency. If the bonus increase were
50%, the hourly remuneration would increase at the rate of
150
--------------- of the ordinary hourly rate per 10% of Speed10 X 100
Efficiency.
Gantt:

This is similar to the Taylor, except that a daily-wage is
assured. Under this system the workman is paid by time until
a high standard of speed is reached, after which, no matter what
time he takes, he is paid for the Standard Time of the task, to
gether with a bonus, usually from 20% to 50%. In the example,
20% has been taken.
It will be noted that between normal speed-efficiency and the
Gantt set-standard for speed-efficiency the employer saves not only
factory indirect charges but direct wages as well. After the set
standard has been reached, the line takes a jump and continues to
rise more rapidly than the Speed-Efficiency line, but not so rapidly
as the Taylor line. Under this, also, as the workman’s speed in
creases, the employer gradually pays more and more for the saving
in factory indirect charges.
Under this scheme a further bonus is given to foremen, when a
given proportion of their men earn the bonus.
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Emerson :

Under this system a daily wage is assured. A standard per
formance is a full and fair task. The standard time is the time
taken by a first class man working at normal speed. In the graph
it is the same as for the other systems, and is regarded as requiring
100% speed-efficiency. As soon as a workman exceeds 66 2/3%
of speed efficiency this is counted as 67%, and from there up to
100% he is paid the ordinary hourly rate for the time worked,
together with a rapidly increasing bonus on the wages for the
time worked. As soon as he passes the 100% point, he is paid the
ordinary hourly rate for the time worked plus the time saved, to
gether with a bonus of 20% on the time worked. The Emerson
bonus rates as given by Kimball* are as follows:
Emerson Bonus Rates

Efficiency
per cent.
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Bonus per
$1.00 wages
0.0001
0.0004
0.0011
0.0022
0.0037
0.0055
0.0076
0.0102
0.0131
0.0164
0.0199
0.0238
0.0280
0.0327
0.0378
0.0433
0.0492
0.0553

Efficiency
per cent.
85
86
87
87.5
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Bonus per
$1.00 wages
0.0617
0.0684
0.0756
0.0794
0.0832
0.0911
0.0991
0.1074
0.1162
0.1256
0.1352
0.1453
0.1557
0.1662
0.1770
0.1881
0.2000

* See Principles of Industrial Organization by Dexter S. Kimball (McGraw-Hill).

The bonus is calculated monthly, and not for individual jobs.
This is done to prevent men from slackening off and taking the
hourly wage for a while, so that they can make special spurts from
time to time in order to earn big bonuses.
It will be noticed in the graph how the Emerson line for the
same hourly rate as the others ($1.00) rises in an upward curve,
which keeps getting steeper until 100% speed-efficiency is reached.
After that it mounts in a straight line above and parallel to the
speed-efficiency line. In other words, below 100% speed-efficiency
the man’s hourly remuneration increases more slowly than his
increase in speed-efficiency, and then more rapidly. After the man’s
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speed has exceeded 100%, his hourly remuneration rises exactly
in proportion to his increase in speed.
Where the $0.831/3 per hour rate is used the line is similar in
shape, but is below the ordinary time line until 100% speed
efficiency is reached, after which it rises, but not so rapidly as the
man’s speed-efficiency increases. In other words, after 100% has
been passed, the employer saves, at an increasing rate, direct
wages as well as factory indirect charges. However, it is apparent
that any system, which entails the use of an hourly-rate less than
the normal, will certainly meet with opposition from the work
men. Accordingly, I have regarded the Emerson as belonging to
the third group of wage-systems.
We must now consider the question of the limit up to which
it will pay the manufacturer to give an extra bonus in order to
save factory indirect expense.
First of all I would emphasize how expensive it is to employ
slow workmen, as against those who work at the normal rate.
The excess cost in direct wages is shown in the graph propor
tionately as between the various systems, by the distances which
the hourly remuneration lines are above the speed-efficiency line.
It will be noted that the Emerson, using the normal hourly rate,
is extremely expensive for all men below 100% speed-efficiency.
If the factory indirect charges averaged $1 per productive hour,
a line to show them would run coincidently with the ordinary time
line. Probably, the indirect charges would show an increase after
the 100% speed-efficiency had been exceeded, and the line would
mount accordingly above the ordinary time line. Just at the
moment, however, we are concerned with the men below 100%
speed-efficiency, and you can judge their excess cost in factory in
direct charges by the distance which its line—taking the ordinary
time line to represent it—runs above the speed-efficiency line.
We will now turn our attention to the men above 100% speed
efficiency. Under the Halsey, Rowan, and Barth systems, as the
speed of production increases, the manufacturer saves, not only
factory indirect expenses, but direct wages as well. The propor
tions as between the systems are shown by the positions of the
lines, the Barth being the cheapest. Accordingly, these systems
will always pay, provided that the estimated allotted times are
reasonably correct. Under the Gantt, also, he saves direct wages,
when the workman is between 100% speed-efficiency and the
standard set for the commencement of its bonus.
Under the Bedeaux and Ordinary Piece Rate he pays neither
less nor more for work done, whether production increases or
decreases, so that under these he will always save factory indirect
charges by means of men who are above 100% in speed-efficiency.
It is provided of course that the factory indirect charges will not
show an utterly disproportionate rise because of consequent
increased power and other expense.
Under the Taylor, Gantt, and Emerson, he pays the full esti293

mated direct-wage cost of each job, and, in addition, an extra sum
as soon as the workmen have reached a certain speed. The points
at which the bonuses commence, and their relative increases are
shown by their hourly remuneration lines in the graph. Under
the Taylor he neither gains nor loses in direct wages until 100%
speed-efficiency is reached. At that point this line jumps up and
the system becomes the most expensive one, being increasingly so.
For practical purposes the Gantt is the cheapest, as, although its
line rises, the rise is very gradual.
Before any of these systems are introduced, careful considera
tion must be made in order to make certain that the manufacturer
is not going to pay away more than he saves. A good margin,
however, must be allowed, because it will seldom follow that the
whole of the time saved is being fully utilized for further produc
tion. A margin must always be allowed for the changing over
and fitting in of jobs.
To emphasize this we will consider a few simple cases, taking
the figures set out in the statement above, and assuming that
factory indirect charges are applied to the cost of the jobs on
the productive-hour basis. Under the Taylor, if the rate for in
direct charges is at $1.00 per productive hour:
At 120% Speed-Efficiency,
$20.00
Saving in indirect charges = 20 hours or
And the extra payment in wages to effect this
30.00
saving =
Resulting in a loss for this job of

$10.00

At 150% Speed-Efficiency,
Saving in indirect charges = 40 hours or
And the extra payment in wages =

$40.00
30.00

Resulting in a saving for this job of

$10.00

If the rate per productive-hour were $2.70:

At 110% Speed-Efficiency,
Saving in indirect charges = 10.91 hours or
And the extra payment in wages =

Resulting in a loss for this job of

$29.45
30.00
00.55

At 120% Speed-Efficiency,
Saving in indirect charges = 20 hours =
And the extra payment in wages =

$54.00
30.00

Resulting in a saving for this job of

$24.00

294

From this it will be seen that such a system, with such a per
centage of bonus, would only pay at the lower speed-efficiencies if
the rate per productive-hour were about 280% of the hourly rate
of wages. As the speed increases so does the net saving on the
job increase, but it is probable that the greater number of work
men will be of 150% speed-efficiency and below.
Under the Gantt, if the rate per productive-hour were 30 cents:
At 120% Speed-Efficiency,
Saving in indirect charges = 20 hours or
$6.00
And the extra payment in wages =
6.00

Resulting in neither loss nor saving
At 130% Speed-Efficiency,
Saving in indirect charges = 27.70 hours or
And the extra payment in wages =

Resulting in a saving for this job of

........
$8.31
6.00
$2.31

From this it will be seen that the Gantt system, with the per
centages given, will pay, if the rate per productive-hour is over
30% of the ordinary hourly rate for direct wages. Always, how
ever, a margin must be left, and a relationship of at least the
following be the rule before the system could be safely introduced:
Productive-Hour Rate ÷ Ordinary Hourly-Wage = 32 ÷ 100.
Under the Emerson, using the normal hourly-rate of wages,
the average speed-efficiency of all the workmen concerned must be
over 100% or the system will result in heavy loss. If the rate per
productive hour is $2.00:
At 110% Speed-Efficiency,
Saving in indirect charges = 10.91 hours or
$21.82
And the extra payment in wages =
21.81
Leaving the very small saving of
At 120% Speed-Efficiency,
Saving in indirect charges = 20 hours or
And the extra payment in wages =

Leaving a saving of

00.01

$40.00
20.00
$20.00

Accordingly, it will be seen that, if the average speed-efficiency
of the workmen in a factory were expected to be only 110%, the
ratio as between the productve-hour rate and the average ordinary
hourly wage must be more than 2 to 1 or a loss will result. In
other words if the average ordinary hourly wage be more than,
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say, 48% of the productive-hour rate, an introduction of the
system would result in a loss. Theoretically, the limit could be
put at 50%, but I have allowed a small margin of 2%; although
this margin will be far too small in some cases. The probability
of an increase in the indirect charge cost, because of increased
consumption of power, etc., in consequence of increased production,
must not be forgotten.
Furthermore, under any bonus or piece-work system the in
spection of finished work must be very thorough, and the expense
of the inspection will increase accordingly. Otherwise, bad work
will slip through, and bad workmen are considerably more ex
pensive than slow ones. When considering the loss that will accrue
through bad or spoiled work, one has to take into account the total
cost, i. e., direct material, direct labor, direct expense, and factory
indirect charges, of bringing the work into its final condition before
it was rejected, and also the total cost of turning it back into
raw material, together with the cost of material wasted.
In conclusion, may I say that any wage-system must be studied
from every standpoint before it is introduced into a concern, as,
once installed, it is difficult to change, unless it is changed for a
system giving the work people a greater advantage. The following
questions must be answered satisfactorily before any wage system
is introduced:
1. Will it be possible to make good use of the time saved?
It will be worse than useless to pay bonuses to get them to speed
up and save time, and then be unable to make use of the time saved.
2. Is it going to give sufficient incentive to the workmen to
get them to increase production to the required amount?
8. Is it going to cost more in the way of bonuses on direct
wages and extra indirect charges for power, etc., than it will save
in normal factory indirect charges? Among the extra charges
must be considered the cost to run the system, which might be
quite an item.
Generally speaking, where the increase in demand is not likely
to be permanent, and so does not warrant a capital outlay in fixed
assets which will be lying idle in slack times, and where factory
indirect charges are heavy, a suitable bonus system will result in
the necessary increase in production, without any great increase
in charges for power, indirect labor, supplies, etc. This can be
accomplished by inducing the workmen to lose not an atom of time,
but to crowd every minute with its full quota of productive work.
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